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THE DUTY OF CARE IN  









This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law.  To fully understand 
that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and 
standards of review.  A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity 
in which individuals regularly engage.  In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as 
the position of the director.  A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage 
in by virtue of his role or position.  A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor 
should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions.  A standard of review states the 
test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose 
liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions.   
In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be 
conflated.  For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they 
should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether 
he drove carefully.  Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a 
transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a 
claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt 
fairly.  
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The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is 
easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any 
given area is a matter of prudential judgment.  In a corporate world in which (i) information was 
perfect, (ii) the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate 
with the incentives for assuming the role, and (iii) institutional considerations never required 
deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be 
identical.  In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate 
law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct.   
Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of 
conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.  The duty of loyalty 
concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, 
or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest.  (I will hereafter refer to such 
action or inaction as self-interested conduct.)  The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct 
and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that 
does not involve his own self-interest.  (I will hereafter refer to such action or inaction as 
disinterested conduct.)   
II. FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
The duty of care of corporate directors and officers is a special case of the duty of care 
imposed throughout the law under the general heading of negligence.  All law builds on moral, 
policy, and experiential propositions.  The law of negligence is no exception. Under the moral 
and policy propositions that underlie the law of negligence, if a person assumes a role whose 
performance involves the risk of injury to others, he is under a duty to perform that role 
carefully, and is subject to blame if he fails to do so.  For example, an actor who assumes the role 
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of driver is under a duty to drive carefully; an actor who assumes the role of doctor is under a 
duty to practice medicine carefully. 
I begin by considering the functions of officers and directors.  Under American corporate 
law and practice, the function of officers is to manage the business of the corporation.  As stated 
in Section 3.01 of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: 
 The management of a business of a publicly held corporation should be 
conducted by or under the supervision of such principal senior executives as are 
designated by the board of directors, and by those other officers and employees to 
whom the management function is delegated by the board or those executives, 
subject to the functions and powers of the board under § 3.02. 1 
 
In contrast, under American corporate law and practice the board of directors does not 
usually have the function of managing the business of the corporation, although it has the power 
to do so (and typically some managers will also sit on the board).  Instead, the board has a 
variety of functions other than managing.  Section 3.02 of the Principles of Corporate 
Governance states the functions of the board of directors of a publicly held corporation as 
follows: 
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and where 
appropriate, replace the principal senior executives; 
 
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation’s business to evaluate whether 
the business is being properly managed; 
 
(3) Review and, where appropriate, approve the corporation’s financial 
objectives and major corporate plans and actions; 
 
(4) Review and, where appropriate, approve major changes in, and 
determinations of other major questions of choice respecting, the appropriate 
auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used in the preparation of 
the corporation’s financial statements; 
 
                                                  
1 Bracketed cross-references in the provisions of the Principles of Corporate Governance are omitted throughout this 
paper. 
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(5) Perform such other functions as are prescribed by law, or assigned to 
the board under a standard of the corporation.2 
 
Section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act sets forth a somewhat different list 
of director functions: 
(c) In the case of a public corporation, the board’s oversight 
responsibilities include attention to:  
 
(i) business performance and plans;  
 
(ii) major risks to which the corporation is or may be exposed;  
 
(iii) the performance and compensation of senior officers;  
 
(iv) policies and practices to foster the corporation’s compliance with law 
and ethical conduct;  
 
(v) preparation of the corporation’s financial statements;  
 
(vi) the effectiveness of the corporation’s internal controls;  
 
(vii) arrangements for providing adequate and timely information to 
directors; and  
 
(viii) the composition of the board and its committees, taking into account 
the important role of independent directors.3 
 
Generally speaking, the difference between Principles of Corporate Governance § 3.02 
and Model Act § 8.31 is one of emphasis.  Principles § 3.02 emphasizes the board’s role in 
selecting the principal senior executives and in monitoring their performance.  The idea here is 
                                                  
2 Section 3.02(a) states the functions that the board of a publicly held corporation is required to perform.  
Section 3.02(b) states the functions that a board of directors also has power to:  
(1) Initiate and adopt corporate plans, commitments, and actions; 
(2) Initiate and adopt changes in accounting principles and practices; 
(3) Provide advice and counsel to the principal senior executives; 
(4) Instruct any committee, principle senior executive, or other officer, and review the 
actions of any committee, principal senior executive, or other officer; 
(5) Make recommendations to shareholders; 
(6) Manage the business of the corporation; 
(7) Act as to all other corporate matters not requiring shareholder approval. 
3 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.30.  Chapter 8 of the Model Act is in the process of being revised.  In 
this paper, I refer to sections in Chapter 8 as they will be when revised, rather than to the existing sections.  I expect 
the revisions to be finally approved in June 2004. 
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that the chief executive officer (“CEO”)—manages the business, and the most important function 
of the board therefore is to select the right person as CEO and thereafter to monitor his 
performance.  Model Act § 8.31 reflects the post-Enron atmosphere, and contemplates a 
somewhat more active board than Principles § 3.02.  Section 8.31 requires the board to actively 
pay attention to business performance, plans, and major risks, and to be actively involved in the 
process or preparing corporation’s financial statements, the effectiveness of the corporation’s 
internal controls, and the systems for providing information to directors. 
In summary, the functions of directors can be categorized as follows.  Directors must 
monitor or oversee the conduct of the corporation’s business to evaluate whether the business is 
being properly managed—primarily by regularly evaluating the corporation’s principal senior 
executives and ensuring that appropriate information systems are in place.  This is known as the 
duty to monitor.  Directors must follow up on information, acquired through monitoring systems 
or otherwise, that should raise cause for concern.  This is known as the duty of inquiry.  
Directors must make decisions on matters that the board is obliged or chooses to act upon.  
Officers have comparable duties, although for most officers decisionmaking is likely to be more 
important than monitoring. 
III. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
I now turn to standards of conduct.  Section 4.01 of the Principles of Corporate 
Governance sets out the traditional standard of care applicable to directors and officers in the 
performance of their functions, in relation to matters in which they are not interested:  
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's 
or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes 
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily 
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and 
under similar circumstances. 
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This standard of conduct has both subjective and objective elements.  Requiring the “care 
that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and 
under similar circumstances” is an objective standard.  Requiring the director or officer to act “in 
a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation” is both 
subjective and objective.  First, the director or officer must subjectively believe that his conduct 
is in the best interests of the corporation.  Second, that belief must be objectively reasonable. 
In contrast to the Principles of Corporate Governance, the Model Business Corporation 
Act (1) draws a distinction between the standards of conduct applicable to officers, on the one 
hand, and to directors, on the other; (2) significantly changes the traditional formulation of the 
standard of care; and (3) explicitly distinguishes between standards of conduct and standards of 
liability.   
Model Act § 8.42 (a) sets out the following standard of conduct for officers: 
An officer, when performing in such capacity, has the duty to act:  
 
(1) in good faith;  
 
(2) with the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances; and  
 
(3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation. 
 
Model Act § 8.30 sets out the following standard of conduct for directors: 
(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of 
a director, shall act: 
(1) in good faith, and  
 
(2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation. 
 
(b) The . . . [directors], when becoming informed in connection with their 
decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall 
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discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances. 
 
Sections 8.30 and 8.42 differ as follows.  One standard of conduct under section 8.42 is 
that an officer “shall act with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise 
under similar circumstances.”  Section 8.31 does not have a precise counterpart to this provision.  
Instead, it provides that directors, “when becoming informed in connection with their decision-
making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties 
with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate  under similar 
circumstances.”   
The Official Comment to section 8.30 stresses that this standard differs from the 
traditional standard: 
In earlier versions of the Model Act the text [read]: ‘‘[a] director shall 
discharge his duties . . . with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances.’’  The use of the phrase 
‘‘ordinarily prudent person’’ in a basic guideline for director conduct, suggesting 
caution or circumspection vis-a-vis danger or risk, has long been problematic 
given the fact that risk-taking decisions are central to the directors’ role.  . . .  In 
order to facilitate its understanding, and analysis, independent of the other general 
standards of conduct for directors, the duty of care element has been set forth as a 
separate standard of conduct in subsection (b). 
 
The Comment also stresses that section 8.30 sets out a standard of conduct, not a standard 
of liability: 
. . . Section 8.30 deals only with standards of conduct (the level of 
performance expected of every director entering into the service of a corporation 
and undertaking the role and responsibilities of the office of director).  The 
section does not deal directly with the liability of a director (although exposure to 
liability will usually result from a failure to honor the standards of conduct 
required to be observed by subsection (a).  . . .  Section 8.30 does, however, play 
an important role in evaluating a director’s conduct and the effectiveness of board 
action.  . . .  Finally, section 8.30 compliance may have a direct bearing on a 
court’s analysis where transactional justification (e.g., a suit to enjoin a pending 
merger) is at issue. . . . 
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 The Comment also explicates as follows two of the important terms used in the text: 
(4) The phrase ‘‘reasonably believe appropriate’’ refers to the array of 
possible options that a person possessing the basic director attributes of common 
sense, practical wisdom and informed judgment would recognize to be available, 
in terms of the degree of care that might be appropriate, and from which a choice 
by such person would be made.  The measure of care that such person might 
determine to be appropriate, in a given instance, would normally involve a 
selection from the range of options and any choice within the realm of reason 
would be an appropriate decision under the standard of care called for under 
subsection (b).  However, a decision that is so removed from the realm of reason, 
or is so unreasonable, that it falls outside the permissible bounds of sound 
discretion, and thus an abuse of discretion, will not satisfy the standard.  
 
(6) The combined phrase ‘‘in a like position . . . under similar 
circumstances’’ is intended to recognize that (a) the nature and extent of 
responsibilities will vary, depending upon such factors as the size, complexity, 
urgency, and location of activities carried on by the particular corporation, (b) 
decisions must be made on the basis of the information known to the directors 
without the benefit of hindsight, and (c) the special background, qualifications, 
and management responsibilities of a particular director may be relevant in 
evaluating that director’s compliance with the standard of care.  Even though the 
combined phrase is intended to take into account the special background, 
qualifications and management responsibilities of a particular director, it does not 
excuse a director lacking business experience or particular expertise from 
exercising the basic director attributes of common sense, practical wisdom, and 
informed judgment.  
 
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I now turn to standards of review.  A standard of review may come into play in 
determining (1) whether a director or officer will be liable; (2) whether corporate action 
generally, or board action in particular, will be valid or at least should be given deference; and 
(3) whether injunctive relief should be issued.  I will focus primarily on standards review for 
purposes of liability. 
There are three strong reasons why, in the case of the director’s duty of care, the standard 
of liability should in at least some kinds of cases differ from the standard of conduct.  The first 
reason is that able persons should not be discouraged from serving as directors by the prospect of 
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liability that vastly exceeds the monetary gains from such service.  The second reason is that an 
inappropriate standard of conduct might lead to the unfair imposition of liability.  The third 
reason is that the law should not provide an incentive to directors to make less risky rather than 
more risky business decisions, because more risky business decisions often have a higher 
expected value than less risky decisions.  For example, suppose that Corporation C has $100 
million in assets.  C's board must choose between Decision X and Decision Y.  Each decision 
requires an investment of $1 million.  Decision X has a 75% likelihood of succeeding.  If the 
decision succeeds, C will gain $2 million.  If it fails, C will lose its $1 million investment.  
Decision Y has a 90% chance of succeeding.  If the decision succeeds, C will gain $1 million.  If 
it fails, C will recover its investment.  It is in the interest of C's shareholders that the board make 
Decision X, even though it is riskier, because the expected value of Decision X is $1.25 million 
(75% of $2 million, minus 25% of $1 million) while the expected value of Decision Y is only 
$900,000 (90% of $1 million).  If directors were unduly concerned with liability for decisions 
that turned out badly, they will be tempted to make Decision Y, even though it is less valuable 
than Decision X. 
I now consider the standards of review applicable to decisionmaking, monitoring, and the 
duty of inquiry.  I begin with decisionmaking. 
A. The Substance or Quality of Decisions 
Decisionmaking has two elements: the process of arriving at the decision, and the 
substance of the decision itself.  The standard of conduct that applies to both elements is 
normally a standard of reasonability.  Thus an actor playing a given role, such as a driver, doctor, 
or director, should follow a reasonable decisionmaking process and should make reasonable 
decisions.  In the corporate context, however, the standard of review of the process of making 
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decisions, on the one hand, and of the substance, or quality, of decisions, on the other, is often 
very different.  Consider first the substance or quality of decisions, which is often reviewed by 
the application of a special standard of review under the business-judgment rule. 
1. The business-judgment rule.  Outside corporate law, when liability turns on 
decisionmaking, normally the focus is on the quality of the decision rather than on the decision-
making process.  For example, if an automobile driver makes a bad decision—that is, a decision 
that falls short of the decision that a reasonable person would make—the driver will be liable 
regardless of the process he followed to arrive at the decision.  In corporate law, in contrast, 
where the issue is whether directors should be liable for a decision that caused harm to the 
corporation, different standards of review are applied to the decisionmaking process and to the 
quality of the decision.  Under the business-judgment rule, the standard of review applied to the 
quality of a director’s decision—that is, the reasonableness of the decision—is much less 
demanding than the standard of review applied to the reasonableness of the decisionmaking 
process. 
The business-judgment rule consists of four conditions, and a special standard of review 
that is applicable, if the four conditions are satisfied, in suits that are based on the substance or 
quality of a decision a director or officer has made, as opposed to the decision-making process he 
utilized to arrive at his decision. 
The four conditions are as follows4: 
First, a judgment must have been made.  So, for example, a director's failure to make due 
inquiry, or any other simple failure to take action (as opposed to a decision to not take an action) 
does not qualify for protection of the rule. 
Second, the director or officer must have informed himself with respect to the business 
                                                  
4 See Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01(c). 
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judgment to the extent he reasonably believes appropriate under the circumstances—that is, he 
must have employed a reasonable decision-making process. 
Third, the decision must have been made in good faith. 
Fourth, the director or officer may not have a financial interest in the subject-matter of 
the decision.  For example, the business-judgment rule is inapplicable to a director’s decision to 
approve the corporation’s purchase of his own property. 
 If the conditions of the business judgment rule are not satisfied, then the standard by 
which the quality of a decision is reviewed is entire fairness or reasonability.  This is nicely 
illustrated by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., in 
1993.5  In that case, Perelman, the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc. (“MAF”), entered into 
negotiations with Kamerman, the CEO of Technicolor, with a view to an acquisition of 
Technicolor by MAF.  On the basis of limited information, Goldman Sachs, an investment 
banker, told Kamerman that a price of $20-22 per share for Technicolor was worth pursuing; that 
a price of $25 might be feasible; and that Kamerman should consider other possible purchasers.  
Six days later, Kamerman and Perelman agreed on a price of $23.  That evening, Kamerman 
called a special meeting of Technicolor’s Board, to be held two days later.  At the meeting, the 
board approved an agreement with Perelman’s company at the $23 price, and recommended that 
Technicolor’s shareholders accept that price. 
 At the trial, the Chancellor found that it was a matter of grave doubt whether 
Technicolor’s board had exercised due care in making its decision, for the following reasons, 
among others.  (1) The agreement was not preceded by a prudent search of alternatives.  (2) 
Given the terms of the merger and the circumstances, the directors had no reasonable basis to 
                                                  
5 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), on remand, 
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). 
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assume that a better offer from a third party could be expected once the agreement was signed.  
(3) Most of the directors had little or no knowledge of an impending sale of the company until 
they arrived at the meeting, and only a few of them had any knowledge of the terms of the sale. 
 On the basis of these conclusions, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Technicolor’s 
board failed to reach an informed decision when it made its decision, so that the business-
judgment rule did not apply.  As a result, the court held, the directors had the burden of showing 
that the transaction was entirely fair.  If the $23 price was not entirely fair, the directors would be 
liable for damages equal to the difference between $23 per share and the fair price.  And, the 
court added, because the business-judgment rule did not apply, the directors had the burden of 
proving that the price was entirely fair.6 
In contrast, if the four conditions of the business-judgment rule are satisfied, then the 
substance or quality of the decision will be reviewed, not under the basic standard of conduct, to 
determine whether the decision was reasonable, but only under a much more limited standard.  
The prevalent formulation of the standard of review under the business-judgment rule, if the four 
conditions to that rule have been satisfied, is that the decision must be rational.7  This rationality 
standard of review is much easier to satisfy than a reasonability standard.  To see how 
exceptional a rationality standard is, we need only think about the judgments we make in 
everyday life.  It is common to characterize a person’s conduct as imprudent or unreasonable, but 
it is very uncommon to characterize a person’s conduct as irrational.   
An obvious example of a decision that fails to satisfy the rationality standard is a decision 
that cannot be coherently explained.  For example, in Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of 
                                                  
6 The court said that in the review of a transaction involving a sale of a company, the directors have the burden of 
establishing that the price offered was the highest value reasonably available under the circumstances.  Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  On remand, the Chancellor held that the price was entirely fair, 
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. 
7 See Principles of Corporate Governance, § 4.01(c)(3). 
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America,8 a corporation’s managers poured a corporation’s funds into the development of a 
single plant even though they knew the plant could not be operated profitably because of various 
factors, including lack of a railroad siding and proper storage areas.9  The court imposed liability 
because the managers’ conduct “defie[d] explanation; in fact, the defendants have failed to give 
any satisfactory explanation or advance any justification for [the] expenditures.”10 
Bill Allen, formerly the Chancellor of Delaware11 and now a professor of law at New 
York University, has argued in several contexts that if a judgment has been made, and the 
director reasonably informed himself, acted in good faith, and was disinterested, then the 
director’s conduct should not be subject even to a review for rationality.  This argument was 
most recently made in an article, Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review 
in Delaware Corporation Law,12 which Chancellor Allen co-authored with Jack Jacobs (then a 
Vice-Chancellor of Delaware, now a member of the Delaware Supreme Court) and Leo Strine, 
also a Vice-Chancellor.  In that article, the argument against even a rationality standard of review 
is made on the basis of two propositions. 
The first proposition is that a decision cannot be irrational if it was made by directors 
who were disinterested and independent, acted in good faith, and employed a reasonable 
decisionmaking process.13  The proposition is incorrect.  For example, an automobile driver 
deciding whether to pull out and pass a very slow car on the highway may consider all the 
                                                  
8 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966). 
9 See id. at 639. 
10 Id. at 646. 
11 The Delaware Court of Chancery is a trial court.  The chief judge of this court is the Chancellor.  The other judges 
are Vice-Chancellors.  The Court of Chancery is not the only trial court in Delaware, but it hears almost all 
corporate-law cases, and specializes in such cases.  Each case is heard, and decided, by the Chancellor or a Vice-
Chancellor, not by a jury, and not by a panel of judges.  Accordingly, the position of the Chancellor is not too 
different from the position of the Vice-Chancellors.  However, the position of Chancellor does carry certain weight, 
and Chancellor Allen was undoubtedly one of the leading corporate-law judges of the last part of the twentieth 
century. 
12 56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001) 
13 Id. at 870. 
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variables carefully, act in good faith and without self-interest (in the sense that under appropriate 
circumstances it is always permissible to pass a very slow driver), and yet make an irrational 
decision that results in an accident.  Similarly, a doctor may irrationally conclude that a certain 
nutritional regimen cures cancer of the brain, and may treat patients accordingly, thereby 
deflecting patients from getting proper care.  He may reach that irrational conclusion even 
though he has studied the literature about cancer and nutrition carefully, and acted in good faith 
and without self-interest.   
Similarly, a director may do his homework, act in good faith and without self-interest, 
and nevertheless make a decision that is so bad as to be irrational—as happened in the Selheimer 
case.  Maybe the driver, the doctor, or the director was just not very smart.  Maybe the driver, the 
doctor, or the director had terrible judgment.   
Do actors often make irrational decisions?  Probably not; and probably directors make 
irrational decisions even more seldom than other actors, because directors usually act as a group, 
and it will be unlikely that a whole group will be irrational.  But to say that directors seldom 
make irrational decisions is far different from saying that they cannot and never do make 
irrational decisions, as Selheimer illustrates.  Unfortunately, both history and everyday 
experience teaches that small groups and even large groups sometimes do act irrationally.  It is 
therefore not the case, as Chancellor Allen argues, that an actor—driver, doctor, or director—
cannot make an irrational decision if he is disinterested and independent, acts in good faith, and 
employs a reasonable decisionmaking process. 
The second proposition underlying the argument that a rationality standard of review 
should not be applied to a decision by a director if the director reasonably informed himself, 
acted in good faith, and was disinterested, is that if those conditions are satisfied, there is no 
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moral or practical basis for the law to impose liability on a director.14  This proposition is also 
incorrect.   
First, an actor who plays a role has a duty to play the role with care, whether the actor is a 
driver, a doctor, or a director.  A driver or a doctor can fairly be held morally responsible for an 
injury even though he has done his best, if he has not lived up to the manner in which his role 
should be played.  The same is true of a director.   
Second, a review for a rationality standard serves a very important practical purpose.  It is 
not always easy to directly determine whether a director did act in good faith, was completely 
disinterested, and did make a reasonable inquiry.  A review for rationality provides an indirect 
check on whether these conditions have been satisfied.  That a decision lacks rationality provides 
strong although indirect evidence that one or more of these conditions have not really been 
satisfied. 
In the balance of this paper, I will refer to the standard of review that is applied if the 
conditions of the business-judgment rule are satisfied as the business-judgment standard.  Under 
this standard, a director or officer will not be liable for a decision that resulted in a loss to the 
corporation, even if the decision is unreasonable, as long as the conditions of the business- 
judgment rule have been satisfied and the decision is rational. 
A rationality standard of review is more demanding of a director than a subjective-good-
faith standard of review.  However, it is considerably less demanding than the relevant standard 
of conduct, which is based on reasonableness.  Why should such a relatively undemanding 
standard of review be applicable to the quality of decisions by corporate directors and officers?  
The answer to this question involves considerations of both fairness and policy. 
a. Fairness.  To begin with, the application of a reasonability standard of review to the 
                                                  
14 Id. at 870 n. 22. 
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substance or quality of disinterested decisions by directors and officers could lead to the unfair 
imposition of liability.  In paradigm negligence cases that involve relatively simple decisions, 
such as automobile accidents, there is often little difference between decisions that turn out badly 
and bad decisions.  Typically, in such cases, only one reasonable decision could have been made 
under a given set of circumstances, and decisions that turn out badly therefore almost inevitably 
were bad decisions. 
In contrast, in the case of business decisions it may often be difficult for factfinders to 
distinguish between bad decisions and good decisions that turn out badly.  Business judgments 
are necessarily made on the basis of incomplete information and in the face of obvious risks, so 
that typically a range of decisions is reasonable.  A business decisionmaker faced with 
uncertainty must make a judgment concerning the relevant probability distribution, and must act 
on that judgment.  If the decisionmaker makes a reasonable assessment of the probability 
distribution, and the outcome falls on the unlucky tail of the distribution, the decisionmaker has 
not made a bad decision, because in any normal probability distribution some outcomes will 
inevitably fall on the unlucky tail.  By way of analogy, a weather forecaster may correctly say 
that there is an 80% chance of rain, and yet it may not rain.  That doesn’t mean the forecaster 
was wrong.  The weather has fallen on the unlucky (20%) tail of the probability distribution.   
Similarly, a director faced with a promising but expensive and untried new technology 
may have to choose between investing in the technology or forgoing such an investment.  Each 
alternative involves certain negative risks.  If the director chooses one alternative, and the 
associated negative risk materializes, the decision has turned out badly, but that doesn’t mean it 
was a bad decision when made. 
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 In a world with perfect information, and no cognitive biases, directors would have no 
constraint in selecting a more risky investment with a higher expected value over a less risky 
investment with a lower expected value.  In the real world, however, there are both informational 
and cognitive constraints that come into play when the board makes a decision that turns out 
badly, and suit is brought against the directors on the ground that the decision was a bad one.  In 
particular, there is a tendency for people judging a decision after the fact to conclude that a 
decision that turned out badly was a bad decision.  This tendency results in part from a limit of 
cognition known as the hindsight bias. 
 Experimental psychology has shown that in hindsight, people consistently exaggerate 
the ease with which outcomes could have been anticipated in foresight.  People view what has 
happened as relatively inevitable.15  Accordingly, people who know that a bad outcome resulted 
from a decision overestimate the extent to which the outcome was predictable, and therefore 
overestimate the extent to which the decisionmaker was at fault for making a bad decision.16  
Essentially, people find it difficult or even impossible to disregard information they possess 
about an outcome.17  That information, in turn, renders those circumstances that originally 
                                                  
15 ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 119-20 (1988); BARUCH FISCHHOFF, FOR 
THOSE CONDEMNED TO STUDY THE PAST: HEURISTICS AND BIASES IN HINDSIGHT, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341-43 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES]; Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight/Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, 1 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 288-299 (1975); Baruch 
Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen”—Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. PERFORMANCE 1-16 (1975) [hereinafter Fischhoff & Beyth]. 
16 See Hal Arkes & Cindy Schipani, Medical Malpractice and the Business Judgment Rule, 73 ORE. L. REV. 587 
(1994) [hereinafter Arkes & Schipani, Medical Malpractice]; Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in 
Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569 (1988); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision 
Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, 
Hindsight Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990); 
Raanan Lipshitz, “Either a Medal or a Corporal:” The Effects of Success and Failure on the Evaluation of Decision 
Making and Decision Makers, 44 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 380 (1989) [hereinafter 
Lipshitz, Success and Failure]; Terence R. Mitchell & Laura S. Kalb, Effects of Outcome of Knowledge and 
Outcome Valence on Supervisors' Evaluations, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 604 (1981). 
17 See Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 
L. & SOC’Y. REV. 123, 144 (1980). 
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pointed to the actual outcome more salient in people’s minds, because those circumstances can 
easily be integrated into a cohesive story that ends with the actual outcome, while circumstances 
pointing in other directions cannot.  Attempting to understand why a particular outcome occurred 
increases the salience of data and reasons that can be integrated into coherent explanatory 
patterns.  Data that cannot easily be integrated in this way tend to be deemphasized or 
reinterpreted to fit the dominant explanation.18 
 The hindsight bias is nicely illustrated by an experiment in which 112 anesthesiologists 
reviewed the anesthesiological care in 21 pairs of case files that were based on actual cases .  
Each anesthesiologist was presented with one case file from each pair.  The patient and the 
treatments described in each of the two paired case files were identical, and the outcomes 
described in all the case files were adverse.  However, the case files were edited so that in one 
case file in each pair the adverse outcome was described as temporary, while in the other case 
file the adverse outcome was described as permanent.  The anesthesiologists were instructed to 
determine, in each of the 21 case files they reviewed, whether the anesthesiologal care was less 
than appropriate, appropriate, or impossible to judge.  When the adverse outcome was described 
as permanent, rather than temporary, the distributions of the anesthesiologists’ judgments 
concerning the appropriateness of the care was shifted by 30 percent.19  Comparable results have 
been obtained in other experiments, even when the subjects have been explicitly instructed to 
                                                  
18 Fischoff & Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen”—Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. PERFORMANCE 1 (1975) at 1; see also Casper, Juror Decision Making, supra, 
at 293:  
The hindsight bias process appears to involve an integration of outcome information into one's 
understanding of the story, influencing judgments about the inevitability of the outcome, perhaps 
by affecting the recall of material or its weighting. 
19 Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of Outcome on Physician Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 J. AM. MED. 
ASSN. 1957 (1991).  This experiment, as well as the hindsight bias, its application to the business judgment rule, and 
other hindsight experiments in the medical area, are discussed in a very illuminating way in Arkes & Schipani, 
Medical Malpractice, supra 20. 
 Duty of Care 3_Vortrag.doc 19 7/9/2004 
disregard outcomes in evaluating fault.20  The hindsight bias is also well-supported by survey 
evidence concerning the attribution of responsibility, and by casual empiricism.21 
As a result of the hindsight bias, under a reasonableness standard of review, fact-finders 
might too often erroneously treat decisions that turned out badly as bad decisions, and unfairly 
hold directors liable for such decisions.  The business-judgment rule protects directors and 
officers from liability as a result of decisions by fact-finders who erroneously conclude, as a 
result of the hindsight bias, that a proper decision that turned out badly was a bad decision.22 
b. Shareholder interests.  By providing directors and officers with a large and proper 
zone of protection when their decisions are attacked, the business-judgment rule makes it easier 
for directors to make sensible but high-risk decisions with high expected value, which will 
benefit shareholders more than low-risk decisions with a lower expected value, as in the case of 
Decisions X and Y in the example discussed earlier.  Thus, the shareholders’ own best interests 
may often be served by conducting only a very limited review of the quality or substance of 
directors’ and officers’ decisions.   
An important point here is that there is an asymmetry between the liability exposure of 
directors who make sensible but high-risk decisions and directors who make low-risk decisions.  
A sensible high-risk decision can be a good decision if it has a high expected value.  If a high-
risk decision has a positive outcome, the corporation, not the directors, will gain.  However, if a 
high-risk decision has a negative outcome, then under a reasonability standard of review, as a 
                                                  
20 See, e.g., Casper, Juror Decision Making, supra, at 20. 
21 See Lipshitz, Success and Failure, supra, at 38 1-82. 
22 Other kinds of decision makers who must make decisions on the basis of incomplete information and in the face 
of obvious risks can often shield themselves from liability for decisions by showing that they followed accepted 
protocols or practices.  See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 278 n.13 (Ct. App. 
1992) (recognizing that medical practitioners have this defense available because “compliance with accepted 
practice is generally taken as conclusive evidence of due care.”) (quoting Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of 
Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 560 (1959)).  In contrast, directors and officers can seldom shield 
themselves in that way, because almost every business decision is unique. 
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result of the hindsight bias the directors might be judged at fault and required to make up the 
corporate loss.  A low-risk decision can be a bad decision if it has a low expected value.  As a 
practical matter, however, bad low-risk decisions will almost never result in liability, or even 
suit.  No one gets sued for not taking enough risk, partly because low-risk decisions result only 
in forgone profits, while high-risk decision that turn out badly result in losses, and partly because 
courts would be reluctant to insist on directors taking more risk.  Accordingly, without the 
protection of the business-judgment rule, directors would have an incentive to prefer low-risk-
and-low-expected-value decisions to sensible high-risk-and-high-expected-value decisions, even 
though the shareholders, who can diversify their risks, would prefer that directors make the latter 
kind of decision.  The business-judgment rule helps to offset that incentive. 
c. Disproportionate liability.  Finally, at least in the case of non-management directors, 
liability for the losses caused by an unreasonable business decision would often be far out of 
proportion to the incentives for accepting a directorship.  Outside directors of publicly held 
corporations typically earn approximately $40,000-$50,000 or so annually in directors’ fees.  In 
contrast, liability for an unreasonable decision can be in the millions.23  Therefore, in the absence 
of some brake on liability for violation of the duty of care, it might become more difficult to 
attract qualified candidates as non-management directors, which also would be contrary to the 
shareholders' own best interests. 
2. The Decisionmaking Process.  In contrast to the rationality standard of review, which 
applies to a review of the substance or quality of decisions, if the conditions of the business-
judgment rule are satisfied, a more rigorous standard of review applies to the decisionmaking 
process.  For example, under section 4.01 of the Principles of Corporate Governance, it is a 
condition to the application of the business-judgment rule that the director or officer must have 
                                                  
23  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 899 (Del. 1985) (Christie, J., dissenting). 
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duly informed himself to the extent he reasonably believes appropriate under the 
circumstances—that is, he must have employed a reasonable decision-making process.  
Similarly, Model Act § 8.30(b) sets out as a standard of conduct for directors that “The . . . 
[directors], when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or 
devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a 
person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”24 
 There are two primary reasons why in American corporate law a more rigorous standard 
of review should and does apply to the decisionmaking process, than to the substance or quality 
of the decision itself. 
 First, the desirability of not giving directors a disincentive to make sensible but more 
risky decisions does not apply the decisionmaking process.  Second, the premise of giving 
directors a wide zone of discretion in their decisions is that they have employed a careful 
decisionmaking process.   
The difference is reflected in both statutory and case law.  For example, Model Act § 
8.31(a), which governs standards of liability—as opposed to the standards of conduct—for 
directors, provides that “A director shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders for 
any decision to take or not to take action, or any failure to take any action, as a director, unless 
                                                  
24 The Comment to Section 8.30(b) states: 
The phrase ‘‘becoming informed,’’ in the context of the decision-making function, refers 
to the process of gaining sufficient familiarity with the background facts and circumstances in 
order to make an informed judgment.  Unless the circumstances would permit a reasonable 
director to conclude that he or she is already sufficiently informed, the standard of care requires 
every director to take steps to become informed about the background facts and circumstances 
before taking action on the matter at hand.  The process typically involves review of written 
materials provided before or at the meeting and attention to/participation in the deliberations 
leading up to a vote.  It can involve consideration of information and data generated by persons 
other than legal counsel, public accountants, etc., retained by the corporation . . . for example, 
review of industry studies or research articles prepared by unrelated parties could be very useful.  
It can also involve direct communications, outside of the boardroom, with members of 
management or other directors. . . . 
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the party asserting liability in a proceeding establishes that . . . the challenged conduct consisted 
or was the result of . . . a decision . . . as to which the director was not informed to an extent the 
director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances .”25 
To put this differently, although the law should not discourage directors and officers 
from making sensible but more risky decisions, it should encourage directors and officers to 
prepare carefully in making those decisions.  Furthermore, a review of whether a director or 
officer has prepared carefully will usually be subject to less risk of error than a review of 
whether a director or officer made a good decision.  More broadly, a substantive review of the 
quality of directors’ decisions for reasonability would typically involve, among other things, a 
determination of what risk levels the corporation should have accepted and what risks it should 
have undertaken—a kind of review that would not only be extremely difficult, but would 
threaten to impinge seriously on corporate autonomy.  In contrast, a review of the 
decisionmaking process typically does not involve such determinations. 
 For all these reasons, the business-judgment rule does not shield the decisionmaking 
process.  Accordingly, the standard of review for liability concerning the decisionmaking process 
is not rationality, but reasonability, or some variant of reasonability.   
 A few courts have adopted a rule that the standard of review of a director’s 
decisionmaking process is gross negligence.”26  The concept of gross negligence is notoriously 
ambiguous, and in practice it is common to find that courts that purport to apply that standard 
actually apply a standard that is either more or less demanding.  Courts that purport to adopt a 
gross-negligence standard in reviewing the decisionmaking process probably do so because the 
performance of these duties seldom presents a cut-and-dried issue, and the gross-negligence 
                                                  
25 Model Act § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(b) (emphasis added). 
26 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). 
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standard of review emphasizes the importance of leaving a play in the joints in determining 
whether the relevant standard of conduct was satisfied.  However, play in the joints is built into 
the very concept of due care.  For example, in Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 27 then-
Vice-Chancellor Berger stated that even under an ordinary-negligence standard, corporate 
directors will not face liability for the failure to focus on an isolated bit of information. 
C. Monitoring 
 A crucial function of directors is to monitor the conduct of the business.  Much oversight 
will be performed through the board’s ongoing review of the corporation’s business 
performance, business plans, and major risks to which the corporation is exposed.  This kind of 
monitoring is reactive to the information that flows to the board naturally.  In addition, however, 
monitoring must be proactive.  To properly exercise its monitoring function the board must also 
ensure that arrangements are in place to provide adequate and timely information to the board.  
More specifically, the board or its committees must ensure that the corporation has appropriate 
mechanisms for preparing the corporation’s financial statements; appropriate policies and 
practices to foster the corporation’s compliance with law and ethical conduct; and effective 
internal controls.   
 The board’s responsibility for giving attention to the adequacy of internal controls is a 
relatively new and particularly important component of the monitoring function.  The most 
authoritative statement concerning internal controls is to be found in the “COSO Report,” a 
comprehensive four-volume report on internal control authored by five accounting organizations 
known as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, and entitled Internal Control: Integrated 
                                                  
27 13 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 1210 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
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Framework. 28  The COSO Report defines internal control as “a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives” in three categories: “effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations.”29  Internal control over each of these objectives consists of five interrelated 
components: the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and 
communication, and monitoring.  A system of internal control is deemed to be effective only if 
all five components are functioning effectively. 
 The board’s role is to use due care to assure itself that an internal control structure is in 
existence, is appropriate, and is effective.  The board’s responsibility in these matters is not to 
ensure that specific controls never fail.  Accordingly, a breakdown in a specific control does not 
in itself establish that the board has not discharged its responsibility. Furthermore, the board need 
not ensure that every conceivable control is in place.  In determining whether any given control 
should be installed, and the extent and contours of a control, the risk of failure if the control is 
not in place must be balanced with the control’s costs.30 
 The board should, however, be responsible for using due care to assure itself that the five 
components of internal control—control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring—are in place in such a way as to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of 
financial reporting, and compliance with corporate policies and legal rules.31 
                                                  
28 COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, AICPA, INTERNAL CONTROL-
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992) [hereinafter COSO REPORT]. 
29 Id. at 9. 
30 See COSO REPORT, supra note 26, at 77; Reports on Internal Control, supra note 13, at 912-13. 
31 See COSO REPORT, supra note 26, at 12-14. 
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 To this end, the board should be especially concerned with overseeing the design and 
integrity of appropriate systems for producing reliable financial and operational information, and 
for assessing the likelihood or frequency of significant risks and considering how such risks 
should be managed. 
 The board should also be especially concerned to assure that appropriate compliance 
programs are in place.  These programs should include the creation and distribution of codes of 
conduct based on corporate policies and legal rules, procedures for ensuring that the substantive 
rules are complied with, and methods for effectively disseminating the programs.  The board 
should monitor the remedial actions taken in response to departures from compliance programs 
and, more generally, the remedial actions taken in response to violations of established corporate 
policies and legal rules, whether or not embodied in corporate codes of conduct.  In addition, the 
board should regulate management interventions to override compliance programs, either by 
prohibiting such interventions without board approval, or by requiring documentation and reports 
to the board if such interventions occur. 
 Also of special importance is the design and integrity of protocols for reporting on 
deficiencies and reportable conditions in internal control.  A deficiency is a condition in the 
internal control structure that is “worthy of attention.”32  A deficiency “may represent a 
perceived, potential, or real shortcoming, or an opportunity to strengthen the internal control 
system to provide a greater likelihood that the entity's objectives will be achieved.” 33  A 
reportable condition is a “significant deficienc[y] in the design or operation of the internal 
control structure, which could adversely affect the organization’s ability to record, process, 
summarize, and report financial data consistent with the assertions of management in the 
                                                  
32 Id. at 70. 
33 Id. 
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financial statements.”34  The board should assure itself that protocols are in place for reporting 
deficiencies to appropriate persons and for reporting reportable conditions to both senior 
executives and the board. 
 Finally, the board should assure itself that periodic evaluations of internal control are 
conducted.  This responsibility includes determining that appropriate portions of the internal 
control structure are reevaluated by personnel with the requisite skills, that the reevaluations 
have adequate scope and depth of coverage and are conducted with adequate frequency, and that 
the methodology for evaluating internal control is logical and appropriate. 
 In addition to being responsible for assuring itself that the design of the internal control 
structure is appropriate and effective, the board is responsible for assuring itself of the proper 
administration of internal control.  The most significant instrument for executing this 
responsibility, at least in large publicly held corporations, is an internal auditing function, 
consisting of a senior internal auditing executive, an internal auditing staff, and in some cases, 
outsourcing. 
 An important case on the duty to monitor is In re Caremark International,35 decided in 
1996 by Chancellor Allen.  Caremark conducted a patient-care and a managed-care business.  
The patient-care business included alternative-site services, and the managed-care business 
included prescription drug programs and the operation of multi-specialty group practices.  A 
substantial part of Caremark’s revenue was derived from third-party payment programs, 
including Medicare and Medicaid.  These payments were subject to the Anti-Referral Payments 
Law (“ARPL”), which prohibited health-care providers from paying any form of remuneration to 
induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients.   
                                                  
34 Id. at 72; see also Auditing Standards Board, AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 60, Communication 
of Internal Control Structure Related Matters Noted in an Audit (1988). 
35 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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 From its inception, Caremark entered into a variety of agreements with health-care 
providers, including consultation agreements with, and research grants to, physicians.  At least 
some of these physicians prescribed or recommended Caremark services or products to Medicare 
recipients and other patients.  Based on these agreements and grants, Caremark was indicted for 
violating ARPL.  Caremark pleaded guilty to mail fraud and agreed to pay civil and criminal 
fines.  Subsequently, it also reimbursed various private and public parties.  In all, Caremark was 
required to make payments of approximately $250 million.   
 Derivative actions based on these payments were brought against the directors, and 
settled.  The issue in Caremark was whether the settlements should be judicially approved.  That 
issue, in turn, depended in part on the duty of the board in connection with the installation of 
monitoring systems.  Chancellor Allen’s important opinion is worth quoting at length: 
 As the facts of this case graphically demonstrate, ordinary business 
decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper in the interior of the 
organization can . . . vitally affect the welfare of the corporation and its ability to 
achieve its various strategic and financial goals.  [This raises] the question, what 
is the board's responsibility with respect to the organization and monitoring of the 
enterprise to assure that the corporation functions within the law to achieve its 
purposes? . . . 
 
 . . . Can it be said . . . that, absent some ground giving rise to suspicion of 
violation of law, . . . corporate directors have no duty to assure that a corporate 
information gathering and reporting system exists which represents a good faith 
attempt to provide senior management and the Board with information respecting 
material acts, events or conditions within the corporation, including compliance 
with applicable statutes and regulations?  I certainly do not believe so. 
 
 . . . I note the elementary fact that relevant and timely information is an 
essential predicate for satisfaction of the board’s supervisory and monitoring role 
under Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. . . . 
 
 . . . [It] would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that . . . corporate 
boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the 
corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems 
exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior 
management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to 
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allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed 
judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and its business 
performance. . . . 
 
 Thus, I am of the view that a director’s obligation includes a duty to 
attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, 
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under 
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses 
caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards. 
 
 However, Chancellor Allen set the standard of review for an alleged breach of this duty at 
a very high (difficult to prove) level, analogous to the business-judgment rule: 
 . . . Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is 
predicted upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation, as . 
. . in this case, in my opinion only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that 
is a necessary condition to liability.  Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as 
evidenced by sustained or systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable 
oversight—is quite high.  But, a demanding test of liability in the oversight 
context is probably beneficial to corporate shareholders as a class, as it is in the 
board decision context, since it makes board service by qualified persons more 
likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith performance of duty by 
such directors. 
 
Somewhat similarly, Model Act § 8.31(a)(2)(iv) makes a director liable for “a sustained 
failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing oversight of the business and affairs of the 
corporation.” 
It is not entirely clear why only a “sustained” failure to devote attention to the oversight 
of the corporation’s business should result in liability.  The concern may be that liability should 
not be imposed for an occasional minor lapse, like missing a few meetings.  The requirement that 
the failure be “sustained” is best interpreted as meaning a failure that is significant, not 
defensible, and uncorrected.  In that connection, Section 8.31(b)(2)(iv) goes on to provide for 
liability for “failure to devote timely attention, by making (or causing to be made) appropriate 
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inquiry, when particular facts and circumstances of significant concern materialize that would 
alert a reasonably attentive director to the need therefore.” 
D. Inquiry 
 The duty to monitor requires, among other things, that the directors take steps to ensure 
that systems are in place that will produce relevant information.  The duty of inquiry is a duty to 
follow up on information that is either deliberately produced by these information systems, or 
fortuitously comes to the attention of one or more directors or the board as a whole, which a 
reasonable person would follow up by further inquiry.  For example, if the board acquires 
information, either deliberately or fortuitously, which suggests that the corporation may be using 
misleading accounting methods, or that the Chief Financial Officer may be embezzling, the 
board is under a duty to launch inquiries to determine if the information is correct, and if so, to 
either itself take appropriate action or order appropriate action to be taken. 
 Because a failure to make inquiry normally does not involve a judgment, the business-
judgment rule does not apply.  The standard of review for liability for failure to make a inquiry 
should be and presumably is the same standard of review that applies to the failure of a director 
to adequately inform himself before making a decision, that is, a reasonability test—either 
negligence or, perhaps, gross negligence. 
V. LIABILITY-LIMITING MECHANISMS 
 If we focus on the effect, as opposed to the purpose, of the business-judgment rule, the 
rule is a liability-limiting mechanism.  As shown above, however, the business-judgment rule 
only applies to a portion of the duty of care, namely, the portion in which a judgment has been 
made and the four conditions of the rule have been satisfied.  Accordingly, the business-
judgment rule does not protect a director who has not prepared reasonably in making a judgment, 
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has failed to reasonably perform the monitoring function, or has failed to reasonably follow up 
on information that gave rise to a duty of inquiry.  In all these cases, liability is appropriate, but 
the issue remains, how much liability?  Violation of the duty of care is much less serious than 
violation of the duty of loyalty; involves only economic, not physical harm.  Furthermore, such 
liability may be out of all proportion to the compensation of a director.  Accordingly, 
mechanisms to limit liability for violation of the duty of care, in addition to the business-
judgment rule, seem appropriate, and have in fact been widely adopted in American corporation 
law.  In this Part, I will consider four such mechanisms: indemnification, insurance, special 
litigation committees, and exculpatory provisions. 
 1. Indemnification.  All American corporation statutes include a provision concerning the 
indemnification of directors and officers.  The statutes vary in some significant details but are 
comparable in their basic structure.  The Delaware statute is typical: 
(b) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is 
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or 
completed action or suit by or in the right of the corporation to procure a 
judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that the person is or was a director, 
officer, employee or agent of the corporation . . . against expenses (including 
attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred by the person in connection with 
the defense or settlement of such action or suit if the person acted in good faith 
and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best 
interests of the corporation and except that no indemnification shall be made in 
respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which such person shall have been 
adjudged to be liable to the corporation unless and only to the extent that the 
Court of Chancery or the court in which such action or suit was brought shall 
determine upon application that, despite the adjudication o f liability but in view of 
all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to 
indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or such other court 
shall deem proper. 
 
(c) To the extent that a present or former director or officer of a 
corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any 
action, suit or proceeding referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, or 
in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, such person shall be indemnified 
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against expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred by 
such person in connection therewith.36 
 
The indemnification mechanism does not provide complete protection for a director who 
is sued for violation of the duty of care, for two reasons.  
First, a corporation normally does not have power to indemnify the director for the 
amount of a judgment against him based on such a violation, although the corporation does have 
power to indemnify him for his expenses in defending a duty-of-care lawsuit, and for the cost of 
a settlement, provided that he acted in good faith and in a manner that he reasonable believed to 
be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation. 
Second, although the corporation has the power to indemnify a director or officer for 
expenses incurred in defending a duty of care lawsuit, and for the cost of a settlement, provided 
that the director acted in good faith and in a manner that he reasonable believed to be in, or not 
opposed to, the best interests of the corporation, the corporation normally is not required to grant 
such indemnification unless either the director or officer was successful on the merits or 
otherwise, or the corporation has given the director a right to such indemnification in the by-laws 
or by contract.  Accordingly, the corporation may refuse to make indemnification in a case where 
indemnification is discretionary rather than required. 
 Third, the corporation may have become insolvent, and unable to pay indemnification. 
2. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance .  All American corporate statutes also allow 
corporations to purchase insurance to reimburse directors and officers for liability incurred in 
that capacity (“D & O insurance”), with certain exceptions, and for attorneys’ fees in defending 
against suits based on such liability.  Again, the Delaware statute is typical: 
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on 
behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 
                                                  
36 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 145(b), (c). 
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corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, 
officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust 
or other enterprise against any liability asserted against such person and incurred 
by such person in any such capacity, or arising out of such person's status as such, 
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person 
against such liability under this section.37 
 
Among approximately 1,325 participants in a 1999 survey, D & O insurance was carried 
by 92% of those corporations with $100-400 million in assets, and those with under $50 million 
in assets; 94% of those with $1-2 billion in assets; and 97% of those with over $10 billion in 
assets.38 
Unlike indemnification, D & O insurance covers liability for judgments against directors 
based on violation of the duty of care.  Like indemnification, however, D & O insurance does not 
render directors and officers completely risk-free with regard to claims based on the duty of care.   
To begin with, the policy limits in D & O insurance typically apply to the combined 
amount of liability and legal expenses, and in any given case the combination of the two may 
exceed the policy limit.39   
Furthermore, many D & O policies contain an “insured v. insured” exclusion, under 
which the insurer is not liable in connection with claims made against a director or officer by the 
corporation, except a claim made in a shareholder’s derivative action (that is, a claim made by a 
shareholder on the corporation’s behalf).  Accordingly, D & O insurance may not protect a 
director against liability for duty of care if suit for violation of the duty is brought by the 
corporation, rather than by a shareholder in a derivative action.  This may occur either because 
(1) the existing board believes that suit should be brought; (2) a new board takes office, through 
                                                  
37 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 145(g). 
38 D & O insurance is commonly referred to as—and often captioned—“liability” insurance, because it insures 
against liability and legal expenses.  Technically, however, D & O is indemnification insurance, because it does not 
require the insurer to defend (although it does require the insurer to indemnify for losses, including defense costs), 
and the insurer’s obligations do not accrue until the claim is settled or adjudicated.  See J. Bishop, The Law of 
Corporate Officers and Directors—Indemnification and Insurance § 8.05 (G. O’Gradney rev. 1994). 
39 See Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins., 10 Cal. App.4th 869, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 (1992). 
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a takeover or otherwise, and the new board believes that suit should be brought; or (3) the 
corporation becomes insolvent, and a bankruptcy trustee brings suit. 
Another characteristic of American D & O insurance that is relevant to the protection 
afforded by such insurance is that such insurance is written on a “claims made” basis—that is, 
the insurance applies to, but only to, claims made while the policy is in force.  To illustrate, 
suppose C Corporation procured a D & O policy from X Insurance Company for 2004.  A claim 
that is based on events that occurred in 2002 may be covered by the policy even though X was 
not C’s insurer in 2002.  Conversely, however, a claim based on events that occurred in 2004 
may not be covered by X’s policy if the claim is not made until 2005, unless a new claims-made 
policy is in effect.40 
 3. Special litigation committees .  Liability for the duty of care usually, although not 
invariably, arises in the context of a derivative action brought by a shareholder on the 
corporation’s behalf.  Often, under American corporate law and practice, the board will create a 
special litigation committee (“SLC”) to investigate the facts giving rise to such an action, and the 
desirability of litigation against a director based on those facts.  Typically, although not 
invariably, the SLC determines that is in the best interest of the corporation that the litigation be 
terminated.  The board, acting for the corporation, then brings a motion to the court requesting 
such termination.   
                                                  
40 The claims-made nature of D & O insurance is often modified by several features.  First, a policy may contain a 
“retroactive date” provision, under which events occurring before a designated date will not be covered by a policy 
even if a claim based on the events is first made during the policy period.  Second, a policy may include a right of 
“discover,” which allows an insured to extend the coverage for a claim made during a limited period after the policy 
has terminated, provided the claim is based on wrongful acts that occurred prior to termination of the policy.  In 
addition, many policies permit an insured to present a notice of occurrence of a possible claim during the policy 
period, which has the same effect as an actual claim made against the insured.  Subject to these exceptions, an effect 
of the claims-made nature of D & O insurance is that a director or executive cannot be positive that he will be 
covered for his present conduct if a claim arises in the future, after the policy has expired or has been canceled. 
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 The law concerning the effect of such a motion is extremely complex, and varies 
considerably from state to state.  For present purposes, it suffices to say that if (1) a majority of 
the board is disinterested and independent; (2) the SLC itself is composed of disinterested and 
independent directors, and does its job carefully and responsibly; and (3) the committee’s 
recommendation is reasonably related to the facts it finds, then the committee’s recommendation 
will be followed by the court.  Accordingly, the SLC is another mechanism that can and does 
serve to limit directors’ liability for violation of the duty of care. 
 Like indemnification and D&O insurance, the SLC mechanism does not provide 
complete insulation against disproportionate liability for violation of the duty of care.  In some 
cases, an SLC may not be appointed for tactical reasons.  In other cases, the SLC that is 
appointed may not conduct itself in a proper way.  Finally, as in the case of indemnification, the 
existing board, or the SLC itself, may conclude that the derivative action has merit; or a new 
board may have taken office, and may conclude the derivative action is merited and not appoint 
an SLC; or the corporation may have become insolvent and the bankruptcy trustee may bring an 
action against the director. 
4. Exculpatory provisions.  Given the limitations on the business-judgment rule, 
indemnification, D & O insurance, and SLCs, to the extent that it is undesirable to subject 
directors to duty-of-care liability that is completely disproportionate to normal director 
compensation, some other mechanism may be required to limit such liability.  In the 1980s, when 
the Principles of Corporate Governance was being drafted, the Reporters suggested such a 
mechanism—allowing a corporation’s certificate of incorporation to include a provision that sets 
a cap on liability.  As finally adopted, Section 7.19 of the Principles provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a failure by a director or an 
officer to meet the standard specified in Part IV [Duty of Care and the Business 
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Judgment Rule] did not either:  
 
(1) Involve a knowing and culpable violation of law by the 
director or officer;  
 
(2) Show a conscious disregard for the duty of the director or 
officer to the corporation under circumstances in which the 
director or officer was aware that the conduct or omission created 
an unjustified risk of serious injury to the corporation; or  
 
(3) Constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention 
that amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the 
corporation; 
 
and the director or officer . . . did not receive a benefit that was improper under 
Part V [The Duty of Fair Dealing], then a provision in a certificate of 
incorporation that limits damages against an officer or a director for such failure 
to an amount not less than such person's annual compensation from the 
corporation should be given effect, if the provision is adopted by a vote of 
disinterested shareholders after disclosure concerning the provision, may be 
repealed by the shareholders at any annual meeting without prior action by the 
board, and does not reduce liability with respect to pending actions or losses 
incurred prior to its adoption. 
 
 The rationale of the provision is stated as follows in the Comment: 
. . . Under present law, a corporate director or officer who is found to have 
violated the duty of care faces potentially enormous liability, depending on the 
magnitude of the economic consequences to the corporation. Although such 
liability has rarely been imposed, it is disturbing that the potential damages are 
often likely to be higher in due care cases than in cases of a willful breach of the 
duty arising under Part V (Duty of Fair Dealing), where defendants generally only 
have to make restitution.  The impact of potential liability in this amount may be 
counterproductive.  . . .  [T]he threat of such liability may chill the willingness of 
independent directors to serve if the potential burdens of office are perceived to 
outweigh the corresponding benefits.  . . .  More generally, the threat of liability 
may make corporate officials excessively risk-averse in their decisionmaking, 
thereby injuring shareholders and diminishing efficiency. Although the business 
judgment rule should serve as the primary bulwark of protection for the board, 
even the diligent and prudent director who complies fully with the requisite 
standard of care may fear that the fact-finder will misperceive the actual facts. . . . 
 
The rationale for such a limitation rests on a variety of considerations. . . .  
 
First and most fundamentally, it is justified on grounds of fairness, 
because the potential liability in cases in which it applies would otherwise be 
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excessive in relation to the nature of the defendant's culpability and the economic 
benefits expected from serving the corporation. 
 
Second, such a limitation should reduce the pressures on directors to act in 
an unduly risk-averse manner. Realistically, the risk of liability for due care 
violations tends to be one-sided:  directors can be held liable for excessively risky 
acts or decisions, but not, as a practical matter, for excessively cautious ones. 
Given the frequently nominal investment of directors in their corporation's stock, 
a substantial risk of liability for negligence might lead risk-averse directors to opt 
for more hesitant policies than shareholders desire (particularly to the extent that 
shareholders hold reasonably diversified portfolios and so are substantially 
protected against any firm- specific risk). 
 
While section 7.19 was still in draft, but in wide circulation, many states adopted variants 
of the idea that underlies that section.  Although the details of these statutes vary, Delaware 
General Corporation Law § 108(b)(7) is both prototypical and of central importance, given the 
role of Delaware in American corporation law.  That section provides as follows: 
 (b) The certificate of incorporation . . . may contain . . . : 
 
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director 
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or 
limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty 
to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts of omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under 
§174 of this title [dividends]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit. 
 
Section 102(b)(7) and like provisions in other states do not in themselves exculpate 
directors from liability.  Rather, these statutes only authorize corporations to adopt exculpatory 
provisions in their certificates within the limits set by the statutes.  It is highly likely that all or 
almost all publicly held American corporations have adopted such certificate provisions.  For 
convenience, I will refer to such provisions as “Section 102(b)(7) certificate provisions.” 
 It might appear that Section 102(b)(7) provides a way to eliminate the duty of care, or at 
least to make that duty meaningless.  In fact, however, this is not the case. 
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 To begin with, Section 102(b)(7) has several exceptions, the most important of which, for 
present purposes, is the exception for conduct that is not in good faith.  Two important cases, 
McCall v. Scott and In re The Walt Disney Corporation Derivative Litigation, have held, in 
effect, that certain kinds of violations of the duty of care are also violations of the duty of good 
faith, and therefore do not come within the protection of a Section 102(b)(7) certificate 
provision.   
McCall v. Scott41 was a derivative action against former directors of Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Columbia”).  The claims arose out of wide-
spread and systematic fraudulent schemes engaged by Columbia, such as systematic overbilling.  
The complaint claimed that Columbia’s senior management, with the board’s knowledge, 
devised these fraudulent schemes to improperly increase Columbia’s revenue and profits, and to 
that end perpetuated a management philosophy that provided strong incentives for employees to 
commit such frauds.   
The technical issue in McCall was whether the allegations in the complaint, if true, 
created a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board was disinterested, so that a derivative 
action could be brought without first making demand on the board.  The governing rule was that 
“While the mere threat of personal liability is not sufficient, reasonable doubt as to the 
disinterestedness of a director is created when the particularized allegations in the complaint 
present ‘a substantial likelihood’ of liability on the part of the director.”  The directors argued 
that the allegations in the complaint did not create a substantial likelihood of liability, because 
the complaint essentially alleged that the board had violated the duty of care, and the directors 
were exculpated from duty-of-care liability under Columbia’s Section 102(b)(7) certificate 
provision.  The district court agreed, and dismissed the complaint.   
                                                  
41 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 3001). 
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On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the directors were not protected by Columbia’s Section 
102(b)(7) certificate provision, because their conduct was reckless, and recklessness was 
equivalent to intentional misconduct, and therefore fell within the exception under Section 
102(b)(7) for intentional misconduct.  The Court of Appeals concluded that on the basis of the 
complaint the behavior of the directors did not constitute intentional misconduct within the 
meaning of Section 102(b)(7), but arguably did fall within the exception to Section 102(b)(7) for 
conduct that was not in good faith: 
Plaintiffs argued that the Board’s failure to take action with respect to the 
systematic fraud occurring at Columbia was tantamount to a conscious decision to 
refrain from acting.  Plaintiffs’ duty of care claims, however, arise out of 
allegations of nonfeasance by the Board (i.e., “intentional ignorance of,” or 
“willful blindness to” the “red flags” that were signs of potentially fraudulent 
practices) and challenge the Board’s failure to take action or investigate under the 
circumstances.  The claims do not allege a conscious Board decision to refrain 
from acting. . . . 
 
Plaintiffs maintain that their duty of care claims are not barred as the 
second exception [to Section 102(b)(7)] excludes protection from director liability 
for “acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct 
or a knowing violation of law.”  Although plaintiffs urge us to interpret 
"intentional misconduct" to include “recklessness,” we do not believe the 
Delaware Supreme Court would interpret the provision in this way.  Still, it is 
unclear whether some reckless acts or omissions may be excluded from the 
protection of provisions adopted pursuant to § 102(b)(7).  As one treatise 
explained:  
 
Whether the statute would protect a director against 
reckless acts is not altogether clear.  To the extent that recklessness 
involves a conscious disregard of a known risk, it could be argued 
that such an approach is not one taken in good faith and thus could 
not be liability exempted under [Section 102(b)(7)]. . . . Balotti & 
Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations and Business 
Organizations § 4.29 at 4-116 to 4-116.1 (3d ed.  Supp. 2000).   
 
Thus, we find the district court erred in concluding that only intentional 
conduct would escape the protection of the provision adopted in Columbia’s . . . 
Certificate of Incorporation. 
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 In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation42 concerned Disney’s employment 
of Michael Ovitz and Ovitz’s later severance payments.  Michael Eisner was (and is) Disney’s 
chief executive officer.  Disney needed a new president to be Eisner’s second-in-command.  
Eisner chose Michael Ovitz who had been Eisner’s close friend for over twenty-five years.  Ovitz 
was the founder and head of a well-known talent agency.  However, he had never been an 
executive of a publicly owned entertainment company. 43 
In September 1995, Disney prepared a draft employment agreement for Ovitz.  At a 
meeting of the board’s compensation committee, the committee members were provided with a 
rough summary of the agreement, but the draft agreement itself was not provided to the 
committee.  Furthermore, even the summary was incomplete.  The summary stated that Ovitz 
was to receive options to purchase five million shares of stock, but did not state the exercise 
price.  Furthermore, no analytical document showing the potential payout to Ovitz, or the 
possible cost of his severance package, was either created or presented to the committee.  Nor 
did the committee request or receive any information as to how the draft agreement compared 
with agreements in the entertainment industry with similarly situated executives.  The committee 
also lacked the benefit of an expert to guide them through the Ovitz employment process.  The 
committee nevertheless approved the general terms and conditions of the employment 
agreement, based on the summary.  The committee did not condition its approval on review of 
the final agreement.  Instead, the committee granted Eisner the authority to approve the final 
terms and conditions of the contract, as long as they were within the framework of the draft. 
Disney’s board met immediately after the compensation committee met.  Again, no 
documents were produced for the board to review before the meeting, no expert was present to 
                                                  
42 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
43 The facts as stated here are as stated in the complaint, which was taken as true by the court for purposes of the 
motion before it. 
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advise the board, and the board did not consider the various payout scenarios if a termination 
occurred.  Final negotiation of the employment agreement was left to Eisner, Ovitz’s close friend 
for over twenty-five years.   
The final employment agreement with Ovitz was executed on December 12, 1995.  
Neither the board nor the compensation committee reviewed or approved the final agreement 
before it was executed.  The final agreement differed significantly from the draft summarized to 
the compensation committee.  One major difference concerned the circumstances surrounding 
Ovitz’s severance benefits.  The draft provided that in the case of a “non-fault” termination Ovitz 
would receive substantial benefits, and that a non-fault termination would occur only if Disney 
wrongfully terminated Ovitz or Ovitz died or became disabled.  The final agreement, however, 
stated that Ovitz would receive non-fault termination benefits if he was terminated by Disney 
and had not acted with gross negligence or malfeasance.  Therefore, under the final agreement 
Ovitz would receive non-fault termination benefits even if even if he was terminated by Disney 
because he acted negligently or was unable to perform his duties, as long as his behavior did not 
reach the level of gross negligence or malfeasance.   
Ovitz’s employment agreement had a five-year term.  The agreement provided that he 
would receive an annual salary of $1 million; an annual bonus between $0 to $10 million; and 
“A” stock options that would enabled Ovitz to purchase three million shares of Disney stock at 
its October 16, 1995 price.  One million of these options would vest in each of the contract’s last 
three years.  If a non-fault termination occurred, however: (1) Ovitz would receive his salary for 
the remainder of the contract, discounted at a risk-free rate keyed to Disney’s borrowing costs.  
(2) Ovitz would also receive a $7.5 million bonus for each year remaining on his contract, 
discounted at the same risk-free rate, even though no set bonus amount was guaranteed in the 
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contract.  (3) All of Ovitz’s “A” stock options would vest immediately, instead of waiting for the 
final three years of his contract.  (4) Ovitz would be paid a lump-sum termination payment of 
$10 million.   
Ovitz’s tenure as Disney’s president was very unsuccessful.  Even though he admittedly 
did not know his job, he studiously avoided attempts to be educated.  Instead of working to learn 
his duties as Disney’s president, Ovitz began seeking alternative employment.  Under his 
contract, Ovitz could only terminate his employment properly if: (1) he was not elected or 
retained as president and a director of Disney; (2) he was assigned duties materially inconsistent 
with his role as president; (3) Disney reduced his annual salary; or (4) Disney failed to grant his 
stock options, pay him discretionary bonuses, or make any required compensation payment.  
None of these events ever occurred.  However, Eisner re-wrote Ovitz’s contract so that in the 
event of Ovitz’s voluntary departure for any reason, Disney would pay him the benefits provided 
for a non-fault termination, and Ovitz’s stock options would immediately vest.  The benefits to 
Ovitz from this modification allegedly totaled $140 million—for doing a terrible job. 
Plaintiffs, Disney shareholders, brought a derivative action against Disney’s directors.  
The directors argued that plaintiffs alleged that the suit should be dismissed, because the 
complaint alleged the board had violated its duty of care, and the directors were exculpated from 
such liability under Disney’s Section 102(b)(7) certificate provision.  The court held that the 
directors were not protected by Section 102(b)(7), because their conduct fell within the exception 
to Section 102(b)(7) for conduct that was not in good faith: 
. . . [T]he facts belie any assertion that the [board] exercised any business 
judgment or made any good faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owed 
to Disney and its shareholders. 
 
No draft employment agreements were presented to the compensation 
committee or to the Disney board for review before the September 26, 1995 
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meetings. . . . With respect to the employment agreement itself, the committee 
received only a summary of its terms and conditions.  No questions were asked 
about the employment agreement.  No time was taken to review the documents 
for approval.  Instead, the committee approved the hiring of Ovitz and directed 
Eisner, Ovitz’s close friend, to carry out the negotiations with regard to certain 
still unresolved and significant details. . . . No presentations were made to the 
[board] regarding the terms of the draft agreement.  No questions were raised, at 
least so far as the minutes reflect.  At the end of the meeting, the [board] 
authorized Ovitz’s hiring as Disney’s president.  No further review or approval of 
the employment agreement occurred.  Throughout both meetings, no expert 
consultant was present to advise the compensation committee or the Old Board. . . 
.  The [board] simply passed off the details to Ovitz and his good friend, Eisner.  
 
. . . The final employment agreement . . . differed substantially from the 
original draft, but evidently no further committee or board review of it ever 
occurred.  The final version of Ovitz’s employment agreement was signed 
(according to the new complaint) without any board input beyond the limited 
discussion on September 26, 1995. 
 
Eisner and Litvack [a director] alone granted Ovitz’s non-fault 
termination, which became public on December 12, 1996.  Again, Disney’s board 
did not appear to question this action, although affirmative board action seemed to 
be required.  On December 27, 1996, Eisner and Litvack, without explanation, 
accelerated the effective date of the non-fault termination, from January 31, 1997, 
to December 27, 1996.  Again, the board apparently took no action; no questions 
were asked as to why this was done. 
 
The . . . complaint . . . charges the . . . Board with a similar ostrich-like 
approach regarding Ovitz’s non-fault termination.  Eisner and Litvack granted 
Ovitz a non-fault termination on December 12, 1996, and the news became public 
that day. . . . [No board] member even asked for a meeting to discuss Eisner’s and 
Litvack’s decision.  On December 27, 1996, when Eisner and Litvack accelerated 
Ovitz’s non-fault termination by over a month, with a payout of more than $38 
million in cash, together with the three million “A” stock options, the board again 
failed to do anything.  Instead, it appears from the . . . complaint that the . . . 
Board played no role in Eisner’s agreement to award Ovitz more than $38 million 
in cash and the three million “A” stock options, all for leaving a job that Ovitz 
had allegedly proven incapable of performing. 
 
The . . . Board apparently never sought to negotiate with Ovitz regarding 
his departure.  Nor, apparently, did it consider whether to seek a termination 
based on fault.  During the fifteen-day period between announcement of Ovitz’s 
termination and its effective date, the . . . Board allegedly chose to remain 
invisible in the process.  The . . . Board: (1) failed to ask why it had not been 
informed; (2) failed to inquire about the conditions and terms of the agreement; 
and (3) failed even to attempt to stop or delay the termination until more 
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information could be collected.  If the board had taken the time or effort to review 
these or other options, perhaps with the assistance of expert legal advisors, the 
business judgment rule might well protect its decision.  In this case, however, the . 
. . complaint asserts that the . . . directors refused to explore any alternatives, and 
refused to even attempt to evaluate the implications of the non-fault termination—
blindly allowing Eisner to hand over to his personal friend, Ovitz, more than $38 
million in cash and the three million “A” stock options. 
 
These facts, if true, do more than portray directors who, in a negligent or 
grossly negligent manner, merely failed to inform themselves or to deliberate 
adequately about an issue of material importance to their corporation.   Instead, the 
facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant directors 
consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,  adopting a “we 
don’t care about the risks” attitude concerning a material corporate decision.  
Knowing or deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act faithfully 
and with appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not have been taken honestly 
and in good faith to advance the best interests of the company.  Put differently, all 
of the alleged facts, if true, imply that the defendant directors knew that they were 
making material decisions without adequate information and without adequate 
deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the 
corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.  Viewed in this light, 
plaintiffs’ new complaint sufficiently alleges a breach of the directors’ obligation 
to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation’s best interests for a Court to 
conclude, if the facts are true, that the defendant directors’ conduct fell outside the 
protection of the business judgment rule.  
 
McCall and Disney turn on, and explicate, the meaning of the director’s duty of good 
faith.  It is well-established that directors do have such a duty.  For example, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the directors of Delaware corporations “have a triad of 
primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”44  Similarly, the Delaware legislature 
has recognized the duty of good faith in Section 108(b)(7): Subsection (i) of that Section sets out 
an exception “for any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty,” while Subsection (ii) separately 
sets out an exception for “acts or omissions not in good faith.” 
Although the existence of a duty of good faith is well established, the precise meaning of 
that duty is not.  One reason for this is that the duty of good faith has several different elements.  
                                                  
44 See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (emphasis added). 
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One of these elements, established in Caremark, McCall, and Disney, overlaps with the duty of 
care.   
Recall that the duty of care itself has several elements, including the duty to monitor and 
the duty of inquiry.  These two elements are not sharply discontinuous, but instead are the ends 
of a spectrum.  The duty of inquiry requires directors to follow up on information that comes to 
them, when a reasonable person would follow up on that information.  The duty to monitor has a 
proactive and a reactive aspect.  The proactive element requires directors to pay attention to 
internal controls and other mechanisms to ensure that appropriate kinds of information flow to 
the board.  The reactive aspect requires directors to pay attention to the stream of information 
that arrives to the board.  Since the duty of inquiry is also reactive, this aspect of the duty to 
monitor overlaps with the duty of inquiry.   
Caremark, McCall, and Disney hold, in effect, that a glaring failure to perform the duty 
of inquiry or the duty to monitor is not only a violation of the duty of care, but also a violation of 
the duty of good faith.  In Caremark, Chancellor Allen stated that “a director’s obligation 
includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting 
system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists . . . .”  In McCall, the court quoted with 
approval the statement that “‘To the extent that recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a 
known risk, it could be argued that such an approach is not one taken in good faith and thus 
could not be liability exempted’” under Section 102(b)(7).  In Disney, the court stated that 
“Knowing or deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act faithfully and with 
appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not have been taken honestly and in good faith to 
advance the best interests of the company.” 
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If a glaring failure to perform the duty of inquiry or the duty to monitor is a violation of 
the duty of care, are there any functional consequences to also conceptualizing such a failure as a 
violation of the duty of good faith?  In fact, there are several such consequences.  The most 
important, for present purposes, is that when conduct constitutes a violation of the duty of good 
faith, the director is not protected by a Section 102(b)(7) certificate provision. 
To summarize, Section 102(b)(7) does not eliminate the duty of care or its significance 
partly because the exception for conduct that is not in good faith overlaps the duty of care.  There 
are three additional reasons why Section 102(b)(7) does not eliminate the duty of care or its 
significance. 
 First, Section 102(b)(7) applies only to directors.  Officers, acting in that capacity, cannot 
be exculpated for violation of the duty of care by a Section 102(b)(7) certificate provision. 
 Second, Section 102(b)(7) applies only to liability, not to the validity or effectiveness of 
board action.  So, for example, in reviewing the recommendation of a board to dismiss a 
derivative action pursuant to the recommendation of an SLC, a court is likely to take into 
account the care with which the SLC made its determination.  Similarly, under Delaware law the 
validity of the action of a board in adopting a defensive action against takeover bids is subject to 
review under an “enhanced” duty of care. 
 Third, the duty of care is a standard of conduct, and standards of conduct have a real bite 
notwithstanding the divergent standards of review and other mechanisms that protect a director.  
A director who makes a decision that conforms to the reasonability standard of conduct will be 
protected against liability.  Accordingly, from the perspective of a director, the reasonability 
standard of conduct is a “safe” rule.  In contrast, the rationality standard of review under the 
business-judgment rule, and the other mechanisms that protect directors against liability for 
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breach of the duty of care, are “risky” rules.  The business-judgment rule is applicable only if the 
conditions to the rule are satisfied, and even then only protects a director if his decision was not 
irrational.  Indemnification is often not mandatory, and sometimes not even permissive.  D & O 
insurance has various exceptions, in particular the exception for “insured v. insured” suits, that 
is, suits by the corporation, as opposed to derivative actions.  SLCs may or may not be 
appointed, and if appointed may or may not recommend dismissal of the action; and even if 
dismissal is recommended, under various circumstances the court may not follow an SLC’s 
recommendation.  Section 102(b)(7) and many like provisions have various exceptions, 
including particularly the exception for conduct that is not in good faith.  In short, a director who 
consciously fails to adhere to the duty-of-care standard of conduct, that requires a director to act 
reasonably, on the premise that he will be protected by the business-judgment rule or any of the 
other protective mechanisms, would be taking a significant risk of liability. 
 The point here is not that the business-judgment rule and these various mechanisms are 
not protective.  On the contrary, they are extremely protective.  Rather, the point is that they are 
not fully protective.  If a director wants full protection against liability for the duty of care, he 
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